Obviously that "documentary" they produced on Melanoma, among the other bribes and ring-kissing.
And of course there is no substance to the approvals. This is basically the general shape of the problem with all of Grump's "policies." They purport to be fixing real longstanding problems. But rather than any kind of serious implementation structured to address the relevant details (source code publication/escrow, professional security review, testing, requirements around updates), they're merely simplistic yes/no hurdles for enabling autocratic corruption and graft.
The opacity is the point. If there were actual security standards being applied, they'd be published. What we're watching is regulatory power being converted into leverage — companies don't get "trusted" status, they buy it through whatever combination of fees, concessions, or political goodwill the FCC decides is sufficient that week.
The real cybersecurity risk isn't Chinese routers. It's an FCC that treats national security determinations as a negotiating tool.
And of course there is no substance to the approvals. This is basically the general shape of the problem with all of Grump's "policies." They purport to be fixing real longstanding problems. But rather than any kind of serious implementation structured to address the relevant details (source code publication/escrow, professional security review, testing, requirements around updates), they're merely simplistic yes/no hurdles for enabling autocratic corruption and graft.